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From: arens@ISI.EDU (Yigal Arens)
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To: bashar@point.cs.uwm.edu
Subject: 124-Assault_on_Lebanon_8_93
Status: O
Report No. 124 Israel Shahak, 15 August 1993
An analysis of the Israeli assault on Lebanon, 25-30 July 1993
Part A. Military Affairs and Strategy
First of all, the Israeli assault on Lebanon which took place
between July 25 and 30, failed to achieve its stated aim. Secondly,
this failure will probably drive the Israeli government to much worse
assaults. The failure of the assault is a view adopted by the more
sophisticated Israeli commentators who, with a few exceptions, dared
not express it openly during the assault itself, but made it
abundantly clear afterwards. The most explicit among them was Uzi
Mahanaimi, the commentator for Intelligence and Arab Affairs for the
rather hawkish "Ha'olam Ha'ze" weekly. Uzi Mahanaimi is a son of
Gideon Mahanaimi, who was the founder of the Arab Department of the
Military Intelligence of Israeli army and its commander until his
death in 1975 (in spite of a running feud with Moshe Dayan). Gideon
Mahanaimi still enjoys almost legendary fame in the Israeli
Intelligence Community; many members make pilgrimages to his grave on
the anniversary of his death. His son, who received an extensive
education in Arab studies, presumably inherited some of his father's
"connections", considering the "leaks" he is privy to and is allowed
to publish. His opinions are hawkish, yet he does not flatter the
Israeli army generals as is common among military affairs
commentators in the Hebrew press.
Under the title "Hizbolah won and not Barak [the Chief of Staff]"
("Ha'olam Ha'ze", August 4, 1993), Mahanaimi produced an analysis of
the results of the Israeli assault which deserves to be reviewed at
length. Many of his conclusions are shared, although less explicitly,
by other prestigious commentators. Mahanaimi begins by noting that
the Lebanese estimate of the number of killed in this assault, a
figure which he trusts, is much lower than the estimate given by the
Israeli army: "For the first time in the history of the wars of the
Israeli army Arabs have published a much lower estimate of their
civilian losses than that announced by the Israeli army Spokesman.
This difference is not a result of chance. The dispute which begins
with the issue of the number of civilian casualties caused by the
Israeli army, ends with the unavoidable question of who won the
combat. The Israeli army claims victory. I will show, and also prove,
that it was Hizbollah which won. It won on points. Not a
straightforward military victory, but a victory nevertheless".
In my view, the high estimates of the number of Lebanese victims
published by the Israeli army was an attempt to assure the Israeli
public that the army did indeed win a victory. Other commentators
compared this novel practice of publishing inflated estimates of
enemy losses with the American use of "body counts" in Vietnam which
served the same purpose.
Mahanaimi's proof that it was Hizbollah which won is based on
several considerations. He points to the fact (which he seems to have
obtained from official sources) that, contrary to the assertions of
the Israeli army, most of those killed by its assault in Lebanon
could not have had any possible connection with Hizbollah cadres.
Many of the casualties were very old, 80 years old or more, who were
not able to escape from their homes. The official purpose of the
Israeli assault, as stated by Rabin, Barak and lesser authorities
countless times, was to alienate the Lebanese villagers from
Hizbollah by forcing them out of their homes and razing their
villages to the ground. But Mahanaimi points out that all reliable
reports from Lebanon confirm that their sympathies, and indeed of all
Lebanese (including the Maronites) for Hizbollah have greatly
increased.
Mahanaimi informs us that on the villagers return "it was the
Hizbollah's bulldozers, not any of the Lebanese government, which
helped the villagers remove the rubble of their former homes and its
trucks delivered basic supplies of food and other forms of help.
Because of such help it is the Hizbollah flags, not Lebanese ones,
which are now hanging on the ruins". The same view is shared by Rafiq
al-Hariri, the Lebanese Prime Minister. Mahanaimi says that, during
the assault Al-Hariri told the Egyptian Foreign minister that he
shares the admiration of all Lebanese for the Hizbollah. This was his
response to the Egyptians who conveyed to him the Israeli message
offering to stop the bombing in return for an undertaking by the
Lebanese government to disband the Hizbollah.
According to Mahanaimi, Hizbollah knew about the Israeli assault
and even about its timing. It probably obtained this information
through its agents who have penetrated the ranks of the so-called
"South Lebanese Army" (SLA). "Hizbollah was confidently awaiting the
Israeli army and it knew exactly what the latter intends to do. From
its point of view it was luring the Israeli army into a prepared
trap. It could do this since under Ehud Barak the Israeli army has
turned into a unimaginative army which always does the expected
thing. The Israeli army, with its systematic destruction of villages,
reacted in Lebanon like a hot-blooded hooligan".
But after all, it was Rabin who, as Defense minister and Prime
Minister, approved Barak's plans. In Mahanaimi's view, echoed by
other commentators, Rabin tends to repeat the same mistake. The
assault is a repetition on a bigger scale of the expulsion of the 400
Palestinians in December 1992. In both cases the declared aim was to
improve the peace process by the use of brute force. In both cases
the peace process was actually retarded. "Those who think that after
the brutal expulsion of more than 300,000 Lebanese from their homes,
after killing tens of them, and after the intentional destruction of
so many of their homes, it would be possible to establish the mood of
`business as usual' in the next round of Washington talks are making
the mistake of their lives".
Moreover, "the order to assault the Galilee with katyushas was
issued in a villa situated in a southern part of Beirut, and not from
any South Lebanese locality. It is there that Hizbollah's high
command is located... For some reason the Israeli army did not touch
it. Hizbollah's cadres are found in villages which the Israeli army
did not reach, preferring to use its aiborne artillery [i.e. combat
helicopters] and its guns. After a week of such bombing, only some 30
Hizbollah cadres were killed, according to the best sources. Even if
the number were about 70, as the Israeli army claims, can this be
considered a victory? When Hizbollah claims that the Israeli army was
afraid to send its soldiers to fight it on the ground, we have to
admit that its claim is not unreasonable".
Mahanaimi also demolishes "Rabin and Barak's analysis of the
operation". Contrary to their statements, he flatly asserts that
"Hizbollah is not a terror organization", since it has strictly
avoided for several years any attack on civilians except in
retaliation for prior Israeli assaults on Lebanese villages. Its
operations in South Lebanon are directed against soldiers of either
the Israeli army or the "South Lebanon Army" (SLA) and its
intelligence. According to what can be understood from reports in the
Hebrew press, Hizbollah also refrains from attacks on civilians it
considers to be collaborators with Israel. Much of its success is due
to this policy which seems to have been adopted around 1984.
Mahanaimi flatly denies that Hizbollah's aim is to destroy Israel,
quoting its statement of purpose which it distributed to its cadres.
(He published that statement also before the assault in order to warn
against making it).
"`Hizbollah differentiates between the Israeli conquest of Southern
Lebanon and the existence of the State of Israel. It is true that a
Jihad, waged without any compromise or admission of defeat should be
carried out against Israel, even if such as struggle will take
hundreds of years. But this Jihad, which includes liberation of
Jerusalem and of all of Palestine and the abolition of Israel as a
state, is the responsibility of the entire Muslim nation after it is
purified [i.e. reconverted to a strict form of Islam]. In contrast to
this Jihad, the Muslims of Lebanon are responsible only for the
expulsion of Israel from the South. For this reason the Hizbollah
Center concentrates its efforts on actions only against the forces of
the Israeli army and its allies situated in the Security Zone'. Thus,
had Israel not bombed Lebanese civilians and caused Hizbollah to
retaliate by shooting katyushas on the Galilee - something Hizbollah
had avoided for a long time - the wastage of so many millions of
dollars, the killing of civilians from both sides and the destruction
of the villages could have been prevented".
Mahanaimi's analysis was supported by other commentators in the
Hebrew press, of whom I will note only three. Teddy Preuss ("Davar",
August 15) who agreed that Hizbollah won, compared the Israeli army
to Goliath and Hizbollah to David. Amir Oren ("Davar", August 13),
one of the most knowledgeable analysts of the Hebrew press, reported
that "seniors of the [Israeli] Security System who have good
knowledge of what really occurs both in Lebanon and in the
Territories, are emphasizing that the military operations of
Hizbollah are many times more efficient and sophisticated than
operations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza
[Strip]". The "seniors" noted that Hamas and Islamic Jihad are
considered to be more efficient than Fatah guerrillas [Black Hawk],
which are in their turn, more efficient than the PFLP units [Red
Eagle], an analysis I agree with. The "seniors" expressed their
apprehension of "the possibility that the Islamic organizations in
Lebanon will begin to cooperate with those in the Territories" and
will impart to them some of their military skills. The "seniors" also
condemned the December 1992 expulsions, since "to expel hundreds of
Palestinians into Hizbollah's oustretched arms can increase the
probability that more brilliant military operations in the
Territories will occur".
Oren shares Mahanaimi's view that Hizbollah is not a terror
organization and ridicules "the State Department which knows no
better than to give Hizbollah greater prestige by declaring it `the
most conspicious terror organization in the world'". He describes
"the renewed Israeli approaches to the U.S.", which apparently took
place recently, for the sake of establishing "a formal alliance
between the U.S. and Israel against their common enemy, the awakening
Islam". However, the U.S. answered, informally, that "millions of
American citizens are Muslims and their number is growing". As Oren
puts it: "the domestic concerns of the U.S., although applying mainly
to Jews, cannot now be limited only to them". It is very probable
that one of the important aims of the Israeli assault on Lebanon was
to try to persuade or compel the U.S. to form such an alliance, but
the attempt failed, at least for the time being.
Yehoshua Porat ("Ha'olam Ha'ze", August 4) condemns the assault on
Lebanon from a point of view which may be called "rationally
hawkish". He supports an Israeli assault on Hizbollah or even on
Lebanon and does not oppose a war with Syria. But he sees the form
which the July assault took as evidence of "a collapse of thought
processes, cowardice, mistaken assumptions and cry-baby attitudes"
prevalent in the Israeli government and army. The "mistaken
assumptions" refer to the declarations of Rabin and Barak that if
masses of Lebanese would be expelled from their homes then "the
expellees will then exert pressure on the Lebanese or the Syrian
government" and cause them to disband Hizbollah. Porat adds two
comments on this. "It was Saddam Hussein who used this method of
bombing a civilian population [of Israel] during the Gulf War. He may
have hoped that if he hit Israeli civilians then the Israeli
government would quickly appeal to the U.S. Administration to stop
its military actions against Iraq. But instead of doing this, the
Israeli government followed a wiser course and was rewarded by
massive U.S. military aid. The Israeli government used the same
weapons as Saddam Hussein and gave them full legitimacy. Therefore,
the next time the Israeli population is attacked the reaction of
civilized states cannot be taken for granted". Therefore, Porat
opines, even if "the greatest mistake which can be imagined" of
bombing civilians was after all adopted, Israel should never admit
that it conducts such a policy. "Had we only given as our sole reason
for bombing the villages that we only want to spare the lives of the
villagers, who may be killed during forthcoming attack on Hizbollah,
it is possible that a greater readiness to follow our wishes would
have been created in Lebanese government circles".
The "rationally hawkish" attitudes and the contradiction they
entail were even more apparent in the opinions of Amnon Abramovitz
("Maariv", August 6). Abramovitz denies that the assault on Lebanon
constituted a war crime but admits that it was an act of terror.
Omitting his legalistic arguments about the scope of war crimes, let
me concentrate on his proof that the assault was an act of terror. It
is taken from the writings of Benjamin Netanyahu, now the Likud
leader. In a preface to a book named "How the West can win" [Hebrew
version] he edited in late 1970s, Netanyahu defines terror as
"violence directed against people who have no connection with the
aims of the terrorists," claiming that "terror chooses civilians as
its target willingly and consciously", that it "threatens civilians
and makes them afraid in order to achieve a political aim" and that
"civilians are the key concept of a terrorist". Although Abramovitz
stops at this point without drawing explicit conclusions, his view is
obvious: that by Netanyahu's reasoning Rabin should be regarded as a
terrorist and the Israeli assault as an act of terror. This does not
mean, however, that Abramovitz opposes the assault on Lebanon. In
another article ("Maariv", August 9) he states that "a government
which sincerely desires peace is allowed to oppress, to bomb and to
exile people". The proof that the Rabin government "sincerely desires
peace" is that "it negotiates with the PLO". Many curious arguments
of this kind about the virtue inherent in bombing or creating
refugees by a peace-loving government were published in the Hebrew
press, and they can be assumed to have a strong effect on Zionist
"left". Thus, Meretz can be relied upon not to oppose the next act of
terror which Rabin can be presumed to commit.
But what Porat says about "the cowardice" and "cry-baby attitudes"
is more significant. He blames "the excessively careful attitude
taken by the Israeli government regarding the possible use of the
mobile ground forces [i.e., the parachooters and the elite units] of
the army... I assume it is possible to obtain information about where
Hizbollah cadres live or where its leaders are located... Direct
attacks on all such places, carried out in inconvenient ways by elite
units would have been more efficient in hitting such targets than the
great number of shells used. It is true that we do not have absolute
certainty that such actions would succeed and that there exists a
danger that our soldiers would be hit, too. But during war such
things happen. If we have no choice but to open a war against
Hizbollah, it should be clear to us that in war there can be no
absolute certainty that the desired results will be obtained and no
guarantee against incurring losses". Since Hizbollah bases are widely
spread over the area of Lebanon, it can be seen that the assault
which Porat prefers would have been much greater in scope than what
Rabin carried out.
This attitude of agreeing with assaulting Lebanon but objecting to
the manner in which it was carried out, was very common in Israel,
both among military commentators who complained that the army was not
allowed to do all what it wanted to do, and among right-wing
politicians. Some of these politicians proposed the conquest of a
part of Lebanon by ordinary ground forces for "humaitarian" reasons,
arguing that such a conquest would be more humane and more effective
than methods employed by Rabin.
Porat's view is that Rabin and Barak chose not to use "mobile
ground forces" not only because of their low level of intelligence
(on this point he may be right) but also because they were afraid of
incurring losses and the reaction of Israeli Jewish public to such
losses. The second reason is termed by Porat "cry-baby attitudes",
for which he blames the public's recent concern about deaths of
soldiers in accidents. Porat is obviously mistaken in this part of
his analysis. The Israeli Jewish public shows a much greater
tolerance for the death of soldiers in action than for their death in
accidents, regarding the latter as unnecessary. Rabin and Barak were
not afraid just of the soldiers being killed in Lebanon. They were
afraid of even a partial military failure of Israeli-initiated
military operations against Hizbollah carried out by the elite units.
This difference in Israeli attitudes can be illustrated by the
following: Let us assume a successful Israeli attack on a Hizbollah
stronghold in which, nevertheless, 10-20% of the attacking force
would be killed. The Israeli Jewish public would have hailed such an
attack as a glorious victory and the losses would have been
considered as a sad but necessary part of such victory. But let us
assume an unsuccessful Israeli attack on a Hizbollah stronghold, in
which the attackers would not be able to achieve their aim of killing
the Hizbollah cadres but still 10-20% of the Israeli force would be
killed. Let us also imagine an event which for the Israeli Jewish
public is even worse than the death of a soldier in action: his
capture by the enemy. In the last two cases there would have been a
storm of protest, caused primarily by the failure and humilation
involved.
We should also recall that each U.S. President promises Israel that
the U.S. will keep the Israeli army's "qualitative edge" over the
Arab armies. Even a partial failure of the elite units against
Hizbollah would have demonstrated to the U.S. that the "qualitative
edge" of the Israeli army is slipping and that the American
investment in Israel does not pay well enough. The obvious conclusion
would be that U.S. investments have to be spread more widely. Such a
change in the American outlook occurred after the Yom Kippur War.
Although only a partial military failure, the war's result sufficed
to persuade Kissinger that Israel can not dominate all the Arab
states easily and therefore Egypt must be appeased to some extent.
Bearing in mind the military efficiency of Hizbollah cadres, as
reported by Mahanaimi and other commentators, it was probably the
fear of even a partial failure that deterred Rabin and Barak from
deploying many elite units of the Israeli army against them. In fact,
the only way Israel can destroy Hizbollah militarily is the one
advocated by military commentators and right-wing politicians: A
conquest of a large part of Lebanon using massive ground forces of a
standard nature, such as infantry and armor. This means a repeat of
the 1982-85 war on a greater scale.
Despite the influential figures who recommend such a criminal
policy, it has in my view no reasonable chance of success, although
in the era of Bosnia it might have some slight chances of partial
success. Such a policy is less risky to Israel and to its "special
relations" with the U.S. than the risks entailed by an attack on
Hizbollah bases all over the Lebanese territory by elite units.
Therefore Rabin may yet attempt "to eradicate Hizbollah" by conquest
of Lebanon, again excusing his criminal policies by saying that they
are intended to help "the peace process". Such an attempt is quite
possible within the framework of Israeli grand strategies.
The possibility of Rabin launching a wide-ranging war can be better
understood by looking carefully into the arguments employed by
influential exponents of Israeli grand strategies who explained how
the assault on Lebanon fitted into them. The basis of these
strategies is the cooperation, tacit or explicit, with the U.S.
Although the U.S. might not agree to all Israeli proposals, such as
an alliance against "the awakening Islam", the entire Hebrew press
takes it for granted that the U.S. fully supported the assault on
Lebanon. Amnon Barzilai, the political correspondent of "Hadashot",
who enjoys good connections with Rabin's entourage, stated explicitly
(July 30) that "Rabin coordinated operation `Accountability' with the
Americans in advance", including the expulsion of the population. He
reported that unnamed "U.S. officials" (probably Christopher) told
Rabin toward the end of the assault: "O.K. We agree to your expulsion
of people. But must you expel as many as a quarter of million?"
Other commentators contrasted the full support the U.S. gives to
Rabin with what they defined as the limited support which the U.S.
gave to Begin in June 1982. Christopher has been affectionally
nicknamed "Super-Haig" or "Ultra-Haig" in the Israeli media.
Barzilai's conclusion, that "Washington is basically sympathetic to
all Israeli positions", is certain to remain a constant for a long
time.
The best detailed exposition of the strategic context of the
assault was given by Labor MK Efraim Sneh ("Yediot Ahronot", July 30)
whose opinions deserve to be extensively quoted. Sneh is one of only
a few who enjoy Rabin's confidence and can be presumed to express his
real views. He spent a long period in the army in high
intelligence-linked posts, reaching the rank of "Coordinator of
Activities", first in Lebanon and then in the West Bank.
In his view the Hizbollah cadres "act as servants of a state
situated about 1,000 kilometers from the Israeli borders and which
never participated in a war between Israel and an Arab state. It is
Iran which controls and finances Hizbollah, furnishes it with weapons
and ammunition and which determines its political and military
targets... The Hizbollah's strategic aim, which is the Iranian wish
to conquer Lebanon, is a part of the Iranian desire to become the
dominant superpower of the Middle East... We don't need a
well-developed imagination in order to describe the consequences of
the conquest of Lebanon as a whole, and particularly of the Security
Zone, by the servants of Iranian militarism. This is why Israel has
to demonstrate, with utmost clarity and determination, what will be
the fate of any area which will accept the rule of Hizbollah. I know
that when I use the terms `utmost clarity' and `determination', I am
using nice expressions for `cruel behavior'. But we have no other
choice except to move the balance of horrors continually to the side
which favors us. We must never allow the creation of a situation in
which the Lebanese will fear Hizbollah more than they fear the
Israeli army".
Although many of the qualities which Sneh ascribes to Iran are
obviously present in Israel to an equal, or maybe even greater
extent, Sneh exposes clearly the essence of Israeli strategic aims:
Its determination to destroy Iran's power. But, since "the servants
of Iranian militarism" in Lebanon remain as active after the assault
as they were before it, and in addition are more popular than ever,
the obvious conclusion is that another Israeli assault, of a much
wider scope and greater cruelty is bound to come, and I think quite
soon.
In contrast to Iran's primary role in Israeli grand strategy, Syria
is regarded mainly as being Iran's ally. Sneh's views on what is
demanded from Syria are quite clear. "The subservience of Hizbollah
to Iran does not remove Syrian responsibility, since Syria is able to
stop completely Hizbollah activities in South Lebanon. Syria can do
this either by itself, or by using the Lebanese government and its
army. The current crisis is intended to give Syria an opportunity to
show either how close, or how shaky, its alliance with Iran really
is. Israel is not able to sign any peace treaty and surely not a
treaty in which it will make territorial sacrifices, with a state
which continues to have a strategic alliance with Iran. Only Syrian
support for a firm Lebanese action to stop Hizbollah's activities can
show that Syria is serious in its attitude to the peace process.
Syria's dalliance in carrying out this duty surely demonstrates the
contrary".
Let me add here my views of the real conditions which Israel tries
to dictate to Syria. I base these views on hints or short statements
embedded in longer articles in the Hebrew press and, therefore, I
will not quote them. Needless to say, the official Israeli
conditions, such as "full peace", are merely disinformation. The four
basic Israeli demands are:
1. That Syria will not just sever all relations with Iran, but that
it will agree to be controlled by the U.S. and, therefore, indirectly
by Israel, just as Egypt is. This includes the demand that Syria will
purchase weapons only from the U.S. and its closest allies, that it
will put its army under the control of American advisers and
cooperate with the U.S. in fighting terrorism.
2. That Syria will destroy or expell every organization considered by
Israel and the U.S. as terrorist, or as "opposing the peace process",
whether located in Lebanon or in its own territory.
3. That the Syrian army be reduced in size by at least a third and
not increased without U.S. consent, that the entire area from the
Golan Heights to "the suburbs of Damascus" be demilitarized, and that
the Americans be the most important party in supervising this
demilitarization.
4. That all Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights will remain, no
matter under which formal regime they will continue to exist. In
return, Israel offers Syria a formal recognition of its sovereignty
over the entire Golan Heights, it agrees to demilitarize most, but
not all of it, to return a small part to Syria at once, and to use
influence in Washington in Syria's favor. I have no information about
what is the real Syrian attitude to these demands.
Part B. Domestic Affairs
The Israeli assault on Lebanon must also be seen in the context of
domestic affairs. The Rabin government is constantly losing in
popularity and credibility, partly because of the corruption and
other scandals in which it is involved and partly because the public
tends less and less to believe the excuse which Rabin (and his
flatterers) offers for each atrocity, scandal and failure: that for
the sake of "the peace process" which only Rabin is able to carry to
a successful conclusion, everything is permissible.
Since it became obvious to the public lately that "the process" has
not led even to an interim arrangement, the government felt the
urgent need for a tangible success in order to enhance its prestige.
During the assault itself this aim was, indeed, achieved among the
general public with the help of a well-organized propaganda campaign
in which the generals and military corrspondents played a major part.
But the better informed commentators were not fooled by the
government's boasts of success and public enthusiasm cooled soon
after the assault ended.
The boastful manner in which the Israeli generals, particularly the
Chief of Staff, regularly spoke on TV during the assault was
compared, even during the assault, to the boastings of American
generals after the Gulf War. Let me quote in this context Yoel
Markus, the most influential Israeli political commentator
("Haaretz", July 27). "On the evening of July 25 [the first day of
assault], the Chief of Staff, the Commander of Military Intelligence
and the Commander of Airforce boastfully enumerated the achievements
of the operation as if it were already over and could be summarized,
in a curious press-conference conducted `in Schwartzkopf's style' and
timed for prime-time TV and Radio. During the press-conference, a
video was shown, exactly as Schwartzkopf had done, with photos of the
targets before and after the completely accurate hits. At the same
time the pilots who participated in the assaults were interviewed.
One of them, with a supersonic helmet on his head and enormous sun
glasses hiding his face, was boasting about his successes,
accomplished against a state which has neither an Airforce nor any
anti-aircraft defenses.
"But, we may assume that while all this was being staged, somewhere
in the hills of Lebanon a man wearing a galabiya led a donkey or was
driving a rusty car on which a katyusha was mounted. While the
generals celebrated he unloaded his burden and shot that lethal
Katyusha on Kiryat Shemona in the midst of their victorious press
conference! It is true that in the video shown by Budinger [the
Commander of Airforce] we didn't see him, but we saw in another, live
TV broadcast, the destruction which was caused. Thus, I can only hope
that the Chief of Staff knows what he says when he promised us that
`finally we will be victorious in this confrontation'".
The opinions of Nahum Barnea, political correspondent for "Yediot
Ahronot" (July 30) also deserve to be quoted extensively. According
to Barnea "more high officers were mobilized for the purpose of
lobbying for the war than for the actual fighting. Had I not heard
the generals of 1982 so logically explaining why we have to conquer
Beirut and rule Lebanon, since we have no other choice, I would find
it easier to accept now the rhetoric of the current high officers...
The parents of this assault, Rabin and Barak, also live in the shadow
of the `Peace for Galilee War'. They learned from the opposition to
that war that the Israeli public measures a military success
according to one principle: the number of Israeli soldiers who are
hit. Therefore Rabin and Barak are ready to fire thousands of shells,
bombs and missiles, to expel half million of human beings from their
homes, in order that no Israeli infantry soldier will have to move on
the ground and be in danger...
During the Gulf War we had a right-wing government headed by
Shamir. It was under pressure, but after careful consideration, at
the end it refrained from action. It is easy to assume what would
have happened had a Labor government ruled, which would have been so
much more susceptible to pressures. Rabin would had acted. Likud
would have supported him of course, and would have demanded that the
action he takes be even greater. The Israeli army generals would have
said, as they are saying now, that we have no other choice".
Hanna Kim ("Hadashot", July 27) informs us that "those who were
present at the Knesset Committee for Foreign and Defense Affairs last
week [before the assault] felt that the Chief of Staff was pressing
the politicians to start a big military operation. Those who read on
the subsequent four days what the military correspondents published
after they got the right briefings, understood that `It is only a
question of time. Let us press the politicians a little more and we
will be inside Lebanon'. Ehud Barak, then Deputy Chief of Staff, used
to speak during the Gulf War about the tickling in his fingers. But
Shamir tied the hands of the generals and decided to show restraint
during the missile attacks". Kim also points out that "those who
helped keep up army pressures' were retired generals who became
politicians. The most important were MK Efraim Sneh, Housing minister
Benjamin Ben Eliezer and Deputy Defense minister Motta Gur".
It was probably due to the relative unpopularity of the assault,
polls notwithstanding, (which as Kim says needed such pressure by the
generals for its inception) that the composition of the Israeli army
forces involved in the present assault differed from those which
invaded Lebanon in 1982. In 1982 a high proportion of the invading
forces were composed of reserves. In 1993 the forces were composed of
professionals and young draftees. Both of these groups are more
chauvinistic than the average. Both can be easily influenced by the
military correspondents, who surpassed, both before and during this
assault, all previous records of virulence and callousness
established in the former wars. Let me quote briefly from a few of
them.
The prize for crassness and inhumanity must be awarded to Alex
Fishman, the military correspondent for "Hadashot". On July 29 he
boasted of the great achievement of the Israeli Airforce. "The
attempt of the Lebanese government to canalize [this was the term he
employed] the refugees to camps in the southern part of the Bak'a or
in Tyre and Sa'ida was answered by Israeli fire, intended to
encourage those who dared be slow in reaching [places] nearer
Beirut". In other words, the Israeli Airforce and artillery bombarded
convoys of refugees who failed to escape in the only direction
"permitted" them by Rabin and Barak! On July 27 Fishman termed the
bombing "a dialogue Israel conducts with the Lebanese government",
protesting that "its volume is ridiculously small". On July 28 "The
Israeli army decided to dirty its hands a little", and the "fruits
were seen in the greatly enlarged caravans of refugees", but "the
Israeli army wasted an entire day when it bombed [Lebanon]
insufficiently".
Yossi Werter ("Hadashot", July 30), quotes an Israeli army officer
who, while briefing foreign correspondents, "explained" to them that
"what they are calling in their reports `the refugee problem' is not
really a refugee problem. The inhabitants of Southern Lebanon can be
divided into three parts. The first part are the rich who always have
a summer house near Beirut and are now enjoying their vacation there.
The second part are the middle class, who have calmly put their
belonging on their car and go to live for a while with relatives, but
not too far away, leaving somebody to geard their house. The third
part are the very poor, who are not leaving, but remain in their
personal shelters in the villages. He explained that what really
makes the inhabitants of South Lebanon move north during the current
hot days of the summer is an Oriental version of the famous French
summer vacationing". Werter does not criticize this lie. Instead he
merely attributes it to the Israeli officers being tired.
Danny Sadeh ("Yediot Ahronot", July 28) quotes a Colonel A. who
reports that "every village gets its daily ration of shells". He was
visiting an artillery unit which "distributes the rations". The
soldiers of the unit told him: "`How lucky we are that we were
transferred here from the Territories. Here we see violence... As
time passes we see that there is nothing terrible in this affair. We
become more professional and improve our shelling abilities'. From
the beginning of the operation the soldiers have become daily more
and more enthusiastic. Yoav Prim and Shay Rothstein, both aged 20,
were transferred to Lebanon straight from patrolling Ramallah. They
explain: `In Ramallah we were bored. It is good that we are here.
Here there is a lot of violence and we see immediate results when our
hits are accurate. It is nice to see accurate hits. It makes us find
the work rewarding, since accuracy depends on our personal
abilities'".
Motti Bassuk, political corrrespondent for "Davar", reported (July
30) that the Chief of Staff, speaking in a government meeting, coolly
defined the aims of the assault as follows: "Our aim is that the
Lebanese will feel worse every 12 hours, and they will know that when
the next 12 hours passes they will feel yet worse". His definition of
aims was "criticized by some ministers" whom Bassuk does not name,
whereupon "Barak said that he was misunderstood, since he did not
mean Lebanese public but only the Lebanese establishment". At this
point Shimon Peres proposed that "Israel should begin a development
drive in Galilee in order to prove that Israel is emerging much
stronger from every struggle that it is forced to undertake". It is
unknown whether his proposal was accepted.
On Levi, the military correspondent of "Davar", reported (July 27)
on his visit to the pilots who bombed Lebanon. He asked them whether
they were "concerned about the slight possibility that they may have
hit civilians and whether they think about who may be in the house or
near it when they shoot a missile on it?" They all answered that
"their targets are being chosen by the command in the rear in whose
judgement they have absolute trust". Then some added personal
excuses. Captain P., a single reservist among the professionals, said
that they "don't want to know whether they killed civilians or not".
Lieutenant I., a kibbutz member, claimed that the missiles they shoot
are so accurate that "one can shoot them through a window of a house
which is near a kindergarten but in any case I know what sort of
people live beyond the borders of Israel and therefore I am not going
to waste time thinking about such questions". All pilots spoke about
the satisfaction they feel after their operations and "the great
competition among the pilots about who will be given more bombing
assignements". According to them they have an outside competition
which they describe as "unfair", with the pilots of the Cobra combat
helicopters. "We do not want them to bomb at all so that we will get
all the interesting work".
"Maariv" sent its fashion correspondent, Li'at Ron to a pilot base.
She reported (July 30) that "the war in Lebanon does not trouble the
pilots at all. Not really. The real war is being waged inside the
offices of wing command, over the privilege to get up in the air and
act, so that your name will appear on `the tablet of justice', where
lists of the happy ones who were chosen for the next attack appear".
She spoke with Colonel A. "who already had taken a warm shower after
his last attack. Each attack takes no more than an hour, including
the destruction of the target". Colonel A. told her: "The Airforce
does not suffer any trauma because of the `Peace for Galilee War'
since it was such a smashing success for us". What he is doing is not
defined as war, since "after all, what I am doing now is so much
easier than bombing targets situated in the depths of Syria or Iraq".
He regards what he is doing as "working" and says that "we all try to
have no emotions. The first time I thought about the human aspect of
this operation was when I looked at the videos of the bombing. It
would be unproductive to think about women and chidren during the
attack itself. You find yourself facing a certain house and you press
[the trigger]. We never speak in the wing about such subjects.
Perhaps if I see on TV what happened to our targets then my present
feelings would change. I consider what I am doing as just. But if I
see a mother sitting and weeping at the bed of her wounded daughter,
the sight would cause me some trouble. But then I would consider it
as the Lebanese work. They are simply trying to show our operation in
a manner which will best serve their interests".
But in spite of pressing even fashion correspondents to work,
"Maariv's" military correspondents were not idle. Immanuel Rosen
(July 23) reported that "the high brass of the General Staff" is
angry with the government ministers for daring to ask the Chief of
Staff questions when he shows them his plans. Part of the blame,
according to the generals, lies with Rabin, since he is both Prime
Minister and Defense minister. This does not leave him enough time to
keep his ministers in order. "Before we deal with Sheikh Nasralla
[the Hizbollah leader], we have to deal with Ora Namir [the Labor and
Welfare minister]".
Rosen proposes that Rabin's favorites do some work to help him by
explaining to some ministers "the facts of life" so that they will
not obstruct the army. But "Maariv" also hired, as its military
correspondent, the services of General (reserves) Yossi Peled, who
retired from the post of Commander of the Northern Command less than
two years ago. Peled regrets (July 27) "that our mindset does not
allow us to smash thoroughly enough and long enough - and until the
bitter end - a civilian population, so that it will really pressure
the Hizbollah to stop its activities. Therefore, with the situation
which was created in the North we can not long avoid a big operation
on the ground".
I cannot bring myself to quote the military correspondents of
Mapam's organ "Al Hamishmar" because of the particularly nauseating
mixture of militarism and hypocrisy in their stories. But I do want
to note that the only Hebrew daily which did not allow its military
correspondents to participate in this disgusting orgy of crass
militarism was "Haaretz". I am not implying that its reporting of the
assault was good or even that it was honest, only that it kept a cool
tone and did not descend to the depth of chauvinistic vulgarity and
callousness of all the other papers.
Two crucial issues largely "disappeared" from the Hebrew press
during the assault and did not reappear until the date of writing of
this report. The first is when the decision of an assault was really
made and the second is the undoubted military successes of Hizbollah
in the "Security Zone" of South Lebanon. Other important issues, such
as why Hizbollah shelled northern Galilee after refraining from doing
so for several months, could be discussed only by satirists, such as
by "Haaretz's" B. Michael, who are given in Israel a latitude in
expressing controversial views similar to what was accorded to
jesters in feudal courts. Israeli propaganda, both for domestic and
outside consumption, tried to create the impression that the assault
on Lebanon was decided upon by the Israeli government only a day or
two before it was begun, on July 25. Whatever was decided upon then
(probably the exact timing and some details), the decision to attack
Lebanon was taken some time before July 11 because it was reported in
the Hebrew press on that date.
Amnon Barzilai then reported in "Hadashot" that "an enormous
majority of government ministers, including those of the dovish wing,
support a military action in Lebanon". Among the ministers who are
regarded (falsely in my opinion) as belonging to "the dovish wing"
and who supported the assault, Barzilai mentions Shimon Peres, "who
enjoys now good relations with Rabin not only in foreign but also in
defense affairs" and who said that "the action must be conducted
wisely, in a sopisticated manner and coolly". Of Meretz ministers,
three supported the attack (Tzaban, Sarid and Rubinstein), while the
fourth, Aloni, was the only minister who opposed it. (Later she was
persuaded to support it.) Barzilai also reports that Rabin "already
informed the Americans" of the Israeli decision and of the reason for
it: "Those who attack the Security Zone will be from now on regarded
as attacking us".
In the same issue of "Hadashot" Alex Fishman opined that "there is
a unanimous determination to change the situation in South Lebanon"
(my emphasis). He added (undoubtedly reflecting Barak's views), the
most interesting Israeli reason for attacking Lebanon, namely to
intentionally create economic damage. "The government of Hariri will
not survive if its plans for economic recovery of the Lebanese
government do not succeed. Hariri courts foreign investors, tries to
form a new loyal army and to create an image of Lebanese
normalization. Severe damage to the [Lebanese] infrastructure will
demonstrate how brittle that normalization is". Israel would, one
suspects, prefer a weak and continually bleeding Lebanon and
therefore one of the purposes of the manner in which the assault was
carried out, including the destruction of so many houses, was to
prevent any economic recovery of Lebanon.
In spite of the efforts of Israeli censorship to block information
about the military deterioration of the so-called "South Lebanese
Army" (SLA), enough details have filtered out in recent months to the
Hebrew press to show that it is facing imminent collapse.
As an example, let me describe the Hizbollah attack on two SLA
fortified positions which took place on July 21, four days before the
assault began. According to "Maariv" (July 22), when a Hizbollah
force advanced "the majority of SLA soldiers in the entire area fled"
without fighting. The Israeli army had to advance to fill the gap.
Hizbollah cadres fired then on the advancing soldiers from the
positions it captured and killed one, retreating without losses
before the Israeli army reached the captured positions. (This was
later described by Israeli propaganda as an act of terror which
caused the still patient Israeli government to act.) From hints in
Hebrew papers of the same date, it can be deduced that all SLA
soldiers in the positions, with the exception of the one holding the
wireless, had run away. The latter closed himself in a steel shelter
(thoughtfully provided in SLA fortified positions for use on such
occasions), and from there wired the Israeli army. Obviously, one
reason for the assault was an attempt to prevent the imminent
collapse of the SLA.
In view of the assault's failure to achieve its purposes, clear by
now to all Lebanese, it seems certain that Israel will have to try to
strike Lebanon again if it wants, as it surely does, to keep Southern
Lebanon in its hands and to use the SLA for routine police (and
torture) duties there.
The unique comments of B. Michael ("Haaretz", July 30) deserve
extensive quoting. Under the sub-title "For the sake of history", he
writes: "In a few days the rewriting will start. In a few days we
shall be asked to believe that the hail of katyusha shells started
before the Operation Accountability, and not at its peak. But please
remember: It is an attack against [Israeli] soldiers which caused the
Operation and not an attack on civilians or on settlements. Seven
soldiers were killed while on duty in the Security Zone. This is what
caused the massive Israeli reaction north of it, a reaction that led,
as duly planned by Hizbollah beforehand, to the firing of katyusha
rockets on Galilee...
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, it seems that the Security
Zone, established to absorb the blows and protect the Galilee, has
turned from an instrument into a target. Attacks on it and the
soldiers stationed there became a justified reason for extending the
fire to areas north of it, and simultaneously to Israeli areas south
of it. This time, all the talk about `the northern settlements as
hostages' is ex-post facto talk.
Hizbollah had turned the villagers of Southern Lebanon north of the
Security Zone into hostages more than it had succeeded with regard to
the inhabitants of Galilee. So, when the Israeli government decided
that the defense of the Security Zone justified attacking the
hostages north of it, all inhabitants of Galilee became necessarily
hostages too.
"Wars create cynical terminologies. The cynical name of `Operation
Accountability' means `they have broken the conditions under which we
gave them their license'. And really, the terms of the license -
stating that Israel will keep the Security Zone and Hizbollah will
try to harass Israel there and drive her out of it - were violated.
But it is not clear who broke them first: Hizbollah which achieved
some big murderous successes, or perhaps Israel which, because of her
frustration at them, extended the area of her reaction far beyond the
security zone".
Under the sub-title "Refugees as envoys", B. Michael exposes the
folly of the Israeli reason for the intentional creation of refugees:
"But the Lebanese refugees were for us not ordinary panic-struck
refugees. These were refugees used as envoys to rush to Beirut to
exert pressure on their government `to do something'. And according
to the carefully planned operation, the Lebanese government would
clap its forehead and mutter `why haven't we thought of that before'
and annihilate Hizbollah at once. Or if it is too weak to do so it
would go to Damascus and press Assad so that he would be the one who
annihilates Hizbollah at once.
"Surely, historical experience teaches us how the creation of a
refugee problem solves everything. Palestinian refugees of 1948 have
brought peace and stability to the entire Middle East; the Egyptian
refugees of the Suez Canal cities prevented the Yom Kippur War, the
shelling of South Lebanon and Beirut brought a New Order to Lebanon
in 1982. I will not mention Bosnia and the many other refugees
carrying in their bags more solutions for all the problems of
mankind. Evidently, the leaders of Hizbollah are also convinced that
if they would only cause the inhabitants of Galilee to become
refugees, they will travel to Jerusalem and press their government to
withdraw from the Security Zone and let Hizbollah establish there an
Islamic Republic as prescribed by its Faith. Therefore, blessed be
the change of [an Israeli] government that freed us from that
megalomaniac Sharon and brought us the sober analytical enlightenment
of Rabin".
"To show the strange logic of the Israeli operation, one could use
a parable. Isn't it like a decision by the Italian government to bomb
villages in Sicily in order to induce their inhabitants to run away
from their houses to Palermo and demonstrate there in front of the
municipality until the latter decides to annihilate the Cosa Nostra?
Or like a decision of the U.S. government in the 1920s to shell
Chicago so that the inhabitants demand from the municipality an end
to organized crime?"
Commenting on Rabin's statements that "if it will not be quiet
here, it won't be quiet there", and that "Israel cannot accept every
attempt to impair its freedom of reaction north of the Security
Zone", B. Michael first notes that "the Prime Minister kept his word.
Now it is neither quiet here, nor there. Noise comes from all
directions". About the second statement he admits to have
difficulties: "For hours I was thinking about this brilliant
statement and still could not understand its meaning. What `freedom
of reaction' really means? Evidently, the routine of the conflict is
as follows: Hizbollah attacks the Israeli army or SLA in the Security
Zone and the latter react. Does Rabin really want that in every case
when the Israeli army bombs a village north of the Security Zone
claiming that Hizbollah cadres are inside it, the Sages of Hizbollah
should meet and say: `This was a only Israeli reaction north of the
Security Zone and therefore we shall do nothing, because freedom of
reaction in this area is very important to the government of Israel'.
I really do not understand".
Indeed, without grasping two crucial facts, the assault on Lebanon
does not make sense, but once they are taken into account it does.
The first is the existence of an Israeli grand strategy, as partially
explained here by MK Sneh. This strategy is based on waging a
regional struggle against Iran and on the establishment of Israeli
hegemony over the entire Middle East. Even more important is the
fact that because the Israeli army is engaged most of the time in
"fighting" the nearly helpless Palestinians, its commanders
necessarily undergo a negative selection and become more and more
stupid. Without taking into account the crassness of which the high
command of the Israeli army is now capable, no analysis of its
strategies is possible. This crassness is by now quite evident to
many Israeli Jews, although censorship largely prevents such views
from being published. It can be seen, however, in the many prevalent
jokes made about the army. I will end this report by quoting one of
them: "We have one general who is so stupid that even the other
generals noticed how stupid he is".