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From: arens@ISI.EDU (Yigal Arens)
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To: bashar@point.cs.uwm.edu
Subject: 129-Religious_Settlers_11_93
Status: O
Report No. 129 Israel Shahak, 26 November 1993
The settlements and the religious settlers
The Rabin government's support of the Jewish settlement in
general and the fiercest possible resistance of especially the
religious settlers to the same government can be defined as two
crucial issues of the current Israeli politics now. More
remarkably, it can be shown that in supporting Jewish settlement
Rabin is supported by the U.S. A clarification of these paradoxes
is in my view possible only via an inquiry into what really goes
under the name of "peace process" in terms of the Israeli
government's deeds and its presentation of those deeds to its
citizenry. This report will first describe the actual policies of
the Rabin government toward the settlers in general and the
religious settlers in particular, and next discuss the ideology
of the religious settlers which commands them to defy that
government with steadily mounting violence, perhaps in spite and
perhaps due to that government's persistent efforts to propitiate
them.
Some more perceptive Hebrew press commentators already realize
that Rabin is no less zealous than Shamir in safeguarding the
interests of all Jewish settlers in the Territories, but with
more circumspection. Also clearly noticed have been the
contradictions between those policies of Rabin and his support to
Oslo Agreement with the PLO, opposed by the settlers. Both points
were elaborated by Meron Benvenisti ("Haaretz", November 11,
1993). After Rabin's amicable meeting with leaders of the
religious settlers on November 10 which occurred right after
strident demonstrations under the slogan "Rabin is a traitor",
Benvenisti observed that "for all the differences in the ideology
the chasm between the two positions is not as deep as some would
like to depict it", yet in practice they "cannot be easily
reconciled, especially during the present stage of negotiations
with the PLO". In substanttiation of his thesis, Benvenisti
points to "the extraordinary generosity with which the government
keeps disbursing money to the settlers for all their daily
activities which include their anti-Arab demonstrations and acts
of vandalism against the Arab property. The gasoline fuelling
their cars and used for burning the tyres blocking the highways"
(and, as other sources describe, Arab property as well.) "The
settlers also use their radio equipment, paid for by the
government, to coordinate their blockades". They receive salaries
[too many to describe them here], all of them "defrayed by lavish
supplies of money from the very same government which they detest
so fiercely". More curiosities of the same kind will be described
later, in the context of discussing the U.S. support for Rabin's
policies toward the settlers.
In order to clarify the real intentions of the Israeli
government, the chief political correspondent of "Haaretz", Uzi
Benziman (November 12), points to three contradictions concealed
in the text of the Agreement with the PLO. "The first and the
most important of them is between the avowed [Israeli] intention
to transfer the Territories to PLO's administration and the
intention to preserve all Jewish settlements in form in which
they now exist. The thus ensuing potential for violent
confrontations makes it downright improbable that both goals
could be reconciled... If Israel indeed wants to withdraw from
the entire Gaza Strip, its withdrawal is doomed to be very
selective, at least during the interim period when some Israeli
army troops are to remain in the Strip. In other words, on the
one hand Israel avows its urgent intention to leave the Strip so
as to spare its soldiers the need to cope with its rebellious
population, but on the other hand, it envisages a solution in the
framework of which it will keep its troops in the same Strip in
order to protect Jewish settlements under conditions which may
well turn out much worse than present". It will be shown that the
Israeli government aims at more than a mere "protection of Jewish
settlements". Benziman's second contradiction stems from
scheduling the beginning of the negotiations for a permanent
solution for March 1996, i.e. two years after Israel is to
withdraw from densely populated areas of the Gaza Strip and from
the Jericho enclave. As Benziman sees it, no one as "reasonable"
as the Israeli negotiators are, would want to now spend so much
time and effort for seeking a solution which is anticipated to
remain in force no longer than until March 1996. The third
contradiction lies in the fact that it does not make sense "to
reach an agreement with the PLO and at the same time to court
Jordan with all the ardor". Benziman makes no attempt to resolve
those contradictions, perhaps because in those days "Haaretz"
strains itself badly to depict the situation in terms as
optimistic as possible, regardless of how much cover up such as
effort requires. The realities of Israeli domestic politics in
general, and of the attitude towards the settlers in particular,
to be described below, will help understand it. Insofar as Jewish
settlements are concerned, there is in my view no contradiction
but a coherent policy.
It is clear why Israeli policies toward the settlement, which
in Israel are frequently reiterated and persistently implemented,
cannot be openly forced on the Palestinian public. As shown in
Report 127, beginning with the end of September a broad Israeli
political consensus emerged around the so-called "five noes"
formula. This consensus can be now looked upon as encompassing
the entire Labor, a majority of Likud and the two Haredi parties,
but not the religious settlers and their supporters. Meretz's
real attitude toward it remains in doubt, but this fact has no
political relevance after Meretz's announcement that "it will not
bring the government down whatever the latter may do, so as not
to halt the peace process". For the purposes of this report only
two noes are of relevance: "no to abandoning any Jewish
settlement, and nope to the imposition of any restraints upon the
Israeli army anywhere in the Territories".
The real implications of these two noes can best be understood
from the probing article by the military correspondent of
"Hadashot", Alex Fishman (October 20). Fishman describes "a
pattern of the interaction which in the last few weeks was
evolved in the Territories between the [Israeli] army and the
Jewish settlers. The Defense ministry and the regional Commands
of [the Israeli army] have established full partnership with the
settlers in seeking solutions to the latter's survival and
security problems in the interim period. In every settlement the
Security Coordinators were asked to prepare documentation
concerning their security problems... Senior officers from the
Commands are visiting every settlement. Every documentary file is
checked together with the settlers... All settlements are
cooperating with the [Israeli] government after coming to the
conclusion that the two sides now have common interests. After
all, the settler files provide Israel with data to be used in the
Tabah negotiations. Even more importantly, the settlers and the
government are united in their resolve to tolerate in the interim
5 year period no precedent that might hurt the [Jewish]
settlement cause".
Fishman concludes, rightly in my view, that "the status quo
with regard to Jewish settlement has become an iron wall
surrounding them". The concept of "an iron wall" has been
borrowed from a historic article by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the
ideological founding father of Likud, published as long ago as
1925. For whole decades it was regarded by the entire Zionist
Labor movement with genuine or faked revulsion. The "iron wall"
means that the Zionist state should behave like a feudal lord
dominating his realm by means of his heavily armored knights
intervening from behind the walls of an impregnable castle, in
order to maintain a status quo, or a "custom", even when
incompatible with the medieval notions of "justice".
In its declarations, Israel claims to be interested only in
defending the "security" of the settlers. Really, it wants to
maintain the status quo, whose nature needs an elaboration since
it is not well understood outside Israel. Fishman says that "the
[Israeli] authorities pay serious consideration to the ways of
protecting the settlements from corrosive impact of natural
factors for five years henceforth. For example, the Gaza Strip
settlement of Netzarim is located within the municipal boundaries
of Gaza City. The inhabited areas of the settlement and Gaza City
are separated by an empty space, some of it under cultivation.
Suppose the Gaza municipality, freed from Israeli control,
decides to extend its areas of habitation and build new
neighborhoods up to the fence surrounding Netzarim. The presently
obtaining security conditions will be thus adversely affected.
The same will be the case if Israel builds a new highway to
Netzarim, bypassing Gaza City, but the Gazans are allowed to
build houses alongside that highway. This is why in Tabah
[negotiations] Israel is seeking to prohibit housing construction
within some reasonable radius from each Jewish settlement and on
both sides of highways serving those settlements". Obviously, the
demands of this type can be even more decisive for the future of
the West Bank, which has much more Jewish settlements, some of
them in close proximity to some relatively large Palestinian
cities like Nablus, Ramallah, El-Bireh, Bethlehem or Hebron, not
to mention hundreds of villages. If applied in all the
Territories, such demands will ensure not only their permanent
domination by Israel from behind the iron walls of the
settlements, but they will also forestall any meaningful
Palestinian economic development and any rise in Palestinian
standard of life, contrary to all lofty declarations.
In an earlier article ("Hadashot", October 15) Fishman
explained the military role of Jewish settlements in the Gaza
Strip and of the highways linking them in terms of their serving
as means of the perpetuation of Israeli domination over the
Palestinians living around them. "Most [Israeli] troops now
deployed in the Gaza Strip need to be redeployed in the Katif
Bloc, which will also be surrounded by a military fence and a
road for the patrols... Several new highways will link the Katif
Bloc with the Gaza Strip settlements not included in it, namely
Kfar Darom, Netzarim and the whole bloc of Jewish settlements at
the northern tip of the Gaza Strip. Those highways must be
extended so as to ensure a direct link between Israel and the
Egyptian border in Rafah. But the problem is not the construction
of those highways, nor obtaining sufficient budget allocations
for them. The problem is how to ensure that the Israelis can
drive safely on those highways for 24 hours a day? This is why
joint patrols of the Israeli army troops with the Palestinian
police are needed. They need to patrol together those highways
and to oversee together the entry points to areas under the
autonomy. This is one of the most sensitive issues of the
Agreement's implementation. The Israeli army wants to cooperate
with the Palestinian police as thoroughly as possible, by
performing joint operations, joint patrolling in every locality
and exchanges of intelligence. But if this doesn't work the army
has also prepared contingency plans which do not envisage any
dependence on the Palestinians. If the joint patrols prove to be
not to their liking, the army will patrol whatever spots it may
consider necessary without them. If they refuse to pursue the
wanted in the autonomous areas together with the Israeli army,
the latter will pursue them there alone".
The case of Netzarim is particularly instructive. It was
described in detail by Nahum Barnea ("Yediot Ahronot", October
1). Netzarim is a decaying kibbutz now inhabited mostly by Gush
Emunim extremists, who are not doing any work. They just study
Talmud, for which they have all their expenses covered by the
government. As Barnea explains it, "the original intention" of
founding Netzarim "was to wedge a Jewish settlement between Gaza
and huge refugee camps located south of it, which in the Israeli
army's lingo are called `the camps of the center'. Like an
isolated fortress, the kibbutz is surrounded from all sides by
huge chunks of Arab populated land. It is separated from the
Jewish populated areas both in Israel and in the Katif Bloc". As
gleefully explained by "a senior in the [Israeli] Security
System, charged with overseeing arrangements for the Israeli army
withdrawal from the concentrations of Palestinian population",
the Oslo Agreement to this scheme, because it "stipulates that
all settlements are to stay on, so that every single settlement
turns into a fortress of military value. Had Netzarim been merely
an Israeli army base, the Palestinians could demand its
abandonment, along with other bases located in the midst of
densely inhabited chunks of the Gaza Strip which the army is
going to abandon. But since Netzarim is plainly defined on the
map as a kibbutz, the Israeli presence is assured there. The
Israeli army can use it for effectively establishing its presence
between the city of Gaza and `the camps of the center'". Hence,
concluded the senior, "had Netzarim not existed, it should have
been invented", because it makes it legal "to turn this
settlement into a roadpost concealing the fortress containing
sizable Israeli army forces". Barnea is right when, after showing
the army support for the religious settlers in Netzarim, he
concludes that "it may yet become a pattern of things to come".
Barnea's prediction was fulfilled during the first weeks of
November, when the Palestinian delegation to the Taba and Cairo
talks suddenly noticed the strategic position of Netzarim and, as
reported by the Hebrew press, asked Israel to evacuate it as "a
gesture". Some Hebrew press commentators have also, rather
timidly, pointed out the difficulties which must result from
keeping of this settlement and the roads leading to it. However,
as reported by "Hadashot" (November 26), Rabin firmly announced
to the Knesset Labor faction, that Israel will insist on keeping
Netzarim. Rabin was also questioned about the results of the
elections to the Bir Zeit University Student Council, in which
the list supported by Arafat was defeated. He responded by making
a comment which shows the nature of the domination which he
expects Israel to wield, through the PLO, over the Palestinians:
"When the Palestinian Police will be present in Bir Zeit, I will
know about the results of such elections in advance".
Rabin government support for settlements has an effect of
encouraging the Gush Emunim settlers, who are ready to settle in
places like Netzarim where their less zealous brethren are
unwilling to go. This may be noticed in particularly sensitive
spots of the West Bank. Hanna Kim ("Hadashot", 8 October)
reported how "during a secret visit, not publicized by the media,
Fuad [Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, the Housing Minister] laid a
cornerstone for a new neighborhood in Efrat [south of Bethlehem].
Despite the avowed policy of freezing the settlements, the
Housing Minister used that occasion to confide to MK Hanan Porat,
one of the project's initiators and a champion of the Gush
Emunim's cause in the Knesset, that hundreds of new and heavily
subsidized housing units were going to be erected there. Yitzhak
Rabin personally instructed the Housing Minister to oversee the
erection of that neighborhood. Although called `new', the
neighborhood is designed to expand greatly Efrat area and attract
throngs of new settlers". Kim also noted that "the Housing
Ministry of Binyamin Ben-Eliezer [Fuad] continues to fortify the
settlements around Jerusalem, and has recently completed the
construction of the most expensive and majestic highway in all if
Israel, which links Gilo with Gush Etzion [both in the West
Bank]". She also gives examples of construction in places remote
from Jerusalem. In Ma'aleh Efraim "the Housing Ministry recently
approved the construction of 45 new housing units to accomodate
650 families". For that purpose, "a project approved by the
Shamir government years ago, but frozen three years before
Labor's rise to power was recently unfrozen".
The best overview of Rabin's settling policies and of the U.S.
covert support for them can be found in an article by Ya'ir Fidel
("Hadashot", 29 October) which merits an extensive coverage here.
Fidel shows that Rabin government subsidizes the settlers no less
than the Shamir government did. The government purchased and
keeps covering the daily expenses of the settlers' buses used for
bringing the settlers and their supporters to demonstrations in
Jerusalem. "A distinct paint of these buses has enabled the TV
watchers to see their presence" at demonstrations. Expenditure
for them was budgeted under the name of the `transfer of funds
for purchasing whatever may be needed for settlers' local
councils and other public associations'. Gasoline for journeys to
demonstrations is paid for via the budgets of local councils
which are subsidized by the government almost in their entirety".
The same scheme is used to pay for "communication sets the Gush
Emunim activists use to spy on the army, and for other items the
settlers require, like public address systems, the generators,
etc".
"But `transfer of funds for purchasing whatever may be needed'
is only a small fraction in a long list of special budgetary
expenditures which the Labor-Meretz government has in the last
year been shovering the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
with. Data collected in the ministries for the purpose of writing
this article show that the Rabin government has only slightly, if
at all, reduced the previous budgetary allocations for the
settlements. Declarations are one thing and reality is another.
The change in priorities, which Rabin touted upon forming his
government, did not affect at all the magnitude of settlers'
expenses... The budgetary cuts which this government has effected
were limited to the infrastructure for unfinished projects, to
construction projects about to begin from scratch, to investment
in new industrial plants, and partly to government subsidies for
expansion of the already existing factories and (also partly) to
paving the new roads".
The difference between the declarations and the reality was
achieved by a crafty ploy. A committee, chaired by Sheves, the
director general of Prime Minister's Office, was set up which
much publicity. It recommended cutting the government expenditure
for the development of settlements. In secrecy, however,
implementation of this recommendation was made contigent on
conclusions reached by two other committees. "The deliberations
of these two committees, held at the government offices in
Jerusalem, do not attract attention of either Israeli or foreign
media, whose membership is known only to a few. One of them is
headed by Yehezkel Harmeleh, a former Likud mayor of Rehovot. His
committee will determine the rate at which the Sheves Committee
recommendations are to be implemented. Meanwhile, during the past
year the government granted the settlers new tax deductions to
the tune of 25 million dolllars", while Sheves Committee's
recommened to cut their present huge tax benefits. The magnitude
of the new deductions can be estimated on the basis of Fidel's
comment that even before they were granted, "simple arithmatic
shows that if Sheves' committee recommendations are implemented,
an average settler family would lose $1,000 annually through
payment of taxes equivalent to what an average Israeli family
pays".
"The Su'ari Committee is expected to determine uniform criteria
of subsidization of municipal authorities by the government. In
the past year the government allocated over $85 million to the
settlers' local councils in the Territories. The Interior
Ministry allocated about $60 million, mainly for salaries of the
employees of those councils. For comparison's sake, the Interior
Ministry allocates about $500 million per year to all local
councils and municipalities in Israel. It follows that the
settlers, whose numbers amount to no more than 2.4 percent of the
Israeli population receive 12 percent of municipal budgets. This
budgetary largesse for the local councils in the Territories has
a consequence: almost half of all the settlers are civil
servants, receiving salaries from the government either directly
or via the local councils. According to a rough estimate prepared
by government ministries [but not published], about 45 percent of
Jews residing in the Territories are employed in the public
sector. For comparison, according to the data of the Central
Bureau of Statistics, the percentage of public sector employees
in Israel amounts to 25 percent. True, in some populous
settlements the percentage of civil servants is close to the
latter figure. Among them are all the towns and settlements
located near Jerusalem, or along the Green Line. Most residents
of such towns and settlements hold ordianry jobs inside Israel,
which means that their social profile doeas not differ much from
other Israeli Jews. But this only means that in hard-core
ideological settlements of Gush Emunim, the percentage of civil
servants on the state's payroll is much higher". There exist
quasi-official estimates which appraise the proportion of the
religious settlers who really are state employees at about 70%.
In my view, if added to this figure are all employees of all
kinds of religious institutions (which are also financed by the
State of Israel) we may end up with an estimate as high as
90-95%. The figure becomes credible through the simple expedient
of taking a walk in Kiryat Arba in order to roughly compare the
number and the size of local businesses with the size of the town
and the number of its inhabitants.
Here is my own personal testimony on how the Israeli government
winks at fictitious occupations for the religious settlers
(Letter-to-the-editor, "Davar", November 15). "I happen to live
near the residence of the Prime Minister, and I use this as an
opportunity for regular talks with the religious settlers from
the Territories who keep demonstrating in front of that
residence. Customarily, I ask them a question: `Since you will
get back home in the Territories long after midnight, how will
you be able to work tomorrow?' Their answers do not leave doubt
that their `occupations' are one big fiction. They may be
nominally defined as a job in a local, regional or any other
council, in a yeshiva, in an association for studying Talmud, or
some other fiction may be invented: but the fact remains that no
one could care less whether such an "employee" reports in the
morning to work or doesn't. The masses of Gush Emunim militants
are on the state payroll for just being what they are. Rabin is
supplying his worst enemies with money extracted from our
pockets.
"Last summer the religious settlers demonstrated for an entire
week on the `Hill of Roses' opposite the Knesset, I went to meet
them there. I passed by a religious settler talking to one of the
handful of secular settlers from the Golan Heights. The former
asked the latter: `Why hardly any from the Heights are here?'
`Because we are busy harvesting cotton', he answered. The Gush
Emunim militant then commented: `Harvesting money in government
ministries is more profitable than harvesting cotton'". My
conclusion was that "Rabin has done nothing to halt the torrent
of money to the religious settlers, nor the torrent of lies about
their supposed jobs. Rabin's generosity still makes it possible
for the religious settlers to live their parasitic lives, and it
provides them with enough free time and resources to organize
their demonstrations against him".
But somewhat more covertly, Rabin's policies are also supported
by the U.S., especially under the Clinton Administration. Fidel
tells how in "August 1992", Rabin as the newly elected Israel's
Prime Minister, met Bush in Maine. A part of the meeting was
spent discussing the settlement issue in relation to Rabin's
request "to unfreeze the loan guarantees in the amount of ten
billion dollars, which the American Administration had frozen
earlier, in retaliation for the Shamir government's investments
in the settlements in the Territories... Somebody from the Prime
Minister's inner circle reconstructed the course of the meeting
from memory: `Right after getting to the subject of the
guarantees, Bush raised the issue of the settlements and of
immense sums of money that Likud government had been spending on
them. He wanted to know what Rabin intended to do". A discussion
ensued during which Rabin announced his intention to continue to
support the settling of the Territories to a considerable extent.
Rabin then declared: "I am not going to expand the settlements
beyond the natural growth of the settlers who are already there".
Bush responded: "if so, I am going to subtract the pertinent
figure from the total of loan guarantees. According to the
agreement I have with the Israeli government, dating from the
Likud administration, everything Israel invests in the
Territories can be subtracted from the loan guarantees." Rabin
agreed: "If you subtract just what we allocate there, we agree."
Rabin's agreement was a deception. Rabin encouraged further
settling in places he used to call "security settlements" which
included the so called "Great Jerusalem", extending over 15-20%
of the entire West Bank area, the Jordan Valley, the Golan
Heights, the Katif Bloc and much else.
Fidel comments that continuity of Israeli settlement policies
can be seen in that "orally Rabin corroborated agreement in
writing concluded by Shamir, which stipulated that the U.S. had
the right to cut from the loan guarantees any money which Israel
invested in the Territories". The only difference was that under
Shamir such agreements were kept top secret. Fidel also says that
"Bush learned from that conversation that Rabin intended to
continue disbursing lots of money for settlements. But he did not
demand that Israel discontinue the disbursement. He only said
that the pertinent sums would subtracted from the loan
guarantees". As mentioned, the Shamir government was careful to
keep its real settlement policies secret. Fidel describes how it
was done. "Under Shamir the funds were channeled via different
ministries in all kinds of ways. Moreover, the Shamir government
made it impossible to compute the total amount of these moneys".
Rabin's government, however, "was forced by Bush to submit to the
Americans a detailed inventory of all expenses on the
settlements, as a condition of obtaining the loan guarantees from
the U.S. government".
Clinton Administration, however, gave up even this minor gain.
Fidel tells how "members of a low-ranking American team visiting
Israel met twice with the high-ranking Finance Ministry
officials, Aharon Fogel and David Brodet and the Prime Minister's
financial advisor, Ilan Plato. The Americans came to determine
the method of computation... It was decided that the Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics would make all computations alone,
without being oversee by any Americans. This decision meant that
the Americans were granting Rabin a significant discount. First
of all, they let Israel alone submit all the data. Second, they
accepted the Israeli view that not everything Israel was spending
in the Territories was to be taken into account and that Israel
was to decide how to categorize the expenditure in question. But
even more significant was the tacit agreement of the Americans to
leave open the question of Israel's investments in the parts of
Jerusalem annexed in 1967. During the second meeting the
Americans were notified that the total obtained by Israeli
computations amounted to $430 million. The Americans did not even
try to question this figure. Unlike their predecessors under
Bush, they did not come out with satellite photographs which
could be compared with figures concerning construction in the
Territories they were provided with. They received explanations
about how the figure in question could be broken down by
ministries, said O.K, took the documents and went home. In truth,
the figure presented to the Americans was by $270 million lower
than the one computed by the [Israeli] Finance Ministry when the
latter did not yet know that the U.S. would consent to ignore
Israel's investments in East Jerusalem. The Finance Ministry then
estimated Israel's yearly investments beyond the Green Line as
amounting to $700 million. The criteria of that computation were
the same as those of the Central Bureau of Statistics".
No wonder Israel did not protest when the U.S. announced that
an additional sum of $7 million would be subtracted from the
guarantees, because the actual Israeli expenditure amounted to
"$437 million, $7 million more than reported by Israel". As Fidel
comments, the difference was supposed to be "accountable for by
Israel's investments in East Jerusalem. The government ministers
knew that in their generosity to Israel, the Americans had
substracted only $7 million from the guarantees instead of the
$270 million Israel invested in East Jerusalem". But the latter
figure is also untrue. Israeli investment in East Jerusalem
cannot but be much higher. In private, "a very senior Israeli
official", allowed himself to grumble. "In a correct relationship
such as ours with the Americans such things are not done".
According to him, "the Americans accepted our data and suddenly
they toss a new figure into the thin air without bothering to
notify us. Moreover, they previously told us that the settlements
were an obstacle to peace and therefore they would cut the funds,
but now that argument will no longer hold. Now we are making
peace while keeping the settlements, yet they keep making their
subtracions. We are taking the risks on the road to peace, for
which they should show some consideration instead of subtracting
from the guarantees". Another "very senior official close to
Yitzhak Rabin" (probably Sheves), was more honest. He said: "I do
not care about the subtractions. Let them subtract even more,
since they give us so much. But they should grant us funds to
cover the exorbitant expenditure of the withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip and Jericho and of the resultant military redeployment. We
have to pay back the guarantees in any case, so perhaps the less
they amount to the better. But we should obtain grants. Besides,
Christopher already told us that subtractions caused by the
settlements might yet be annulled".
Yet "some Likud MKs, mainly Dan Tihon, tried to raise hell.
They were quickly silenced by the government, evidently after
they were told the secret. A senior Israeli official explained
that by the way of a symbolic subtraction the Americans managed
to kill two birds with one stone. They signalled to Israelis that
they could construct in East Jerusalem without incurring any
financial penalties, and they gave the Palestinians what they
like above all else, namely the symbols, by making it explicit
that East Jerusalem was considered an occupied territory". No
wonder Fidel, after listing allocations for the settlements
figuring in every ministry's budget proposals for 1994, the
ministries held by Meretz included, says in his conclusion:
"Rabin can be predicted to continue to refuse to keep the
settlements dry of funds. And the Americans will continue to
understand him". All subsequent news bear this conclusion out.
However, the settlers in the Territories should not be regarded
as one homogenous bloc. As assumed by Fidel, the mainly secular
settlers of the towns and other localities close to the Israeli
borders work mainly in Israel. Among those of the Golan Heights,
Jordan valley and other places, the proportion of farmers (though
heavily dependent on hired labor, often of Thais imported for the
purpose), is high. It is only the bulk of the religious settlers
who are employed mainly in fictitious ocupations, and
consequently have plenty of time and opportunity to demonstrate
against the government and to make pogroms against the
Palestinians. Though this subject will be discussed in another
report, let me point out that almost all settler attacks on the
Palestinians are carried out by the religious settlers. It is
easy to distinguish a religious from a secular settler by the
dinstictive head covering of the former. It can be assumed that
the religious settlers have by now created in the Territories a
new type of society. Discussion of this subject appears in my
article ("Haaretz", November 15) from which I will proceed to
quote extensively.
"Any analysis of 1988 and 1992 Knesset elections can show that
there exist two quite different kinds of settlers. In settlement
towns such as Ariel or Karney Shomron the electoral returns
showed a rather even distribution of votes for the larger
[Israeli] parties, even if somewhat skewed in favor of the
right-wing ones as compared to the national averages. In Kiryat
Arba by contrast, Labor and Likud which jointly hold no less than
76 [out of 120] Knesset seats, did not even obtain 5% of vote. In
other Jewish religious settlements in the Territories hardly any
votes fell upon any of the four largest [Israeli] parties (Labor,
Likud, Meretz and Tzomet), which in the 1992 elections jointly
received about 80% of the vote and 96 Knesset seats. Instead, the
religious settlements voted for the religious or Haredi parties
(i.e. National Religious Party, Agudat Israel and Shass), and to
some extent for the transfer-mongering Moledet party which also
is partly religious. The Haredi parties were voted for not only
in the exclusively Haredi towns settlement in the Territories
like Immanuel or Beitar, but also in other religious settlements.
Such distribution of electoral returns means that a new society
has emerged in the Territiries: a society qualitatively different
from the Israeli Jewish one, and saturated by religious
extremism".
This new society is governed like other societes of religious
fanatics. "All organizations of religious fanatics, whether in
Judaism, Islam or Christianity, are committed to the principle of
unconditional supremacy of the religious authority over its
secular servants, regardless of whether the latter are
politicians or PR executives on the religious authority's
payroll... The religious settlers recognize as their
unconditional authority their rabbis, assembled in the `The
Committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District'. In
order to know what the real intentions of the religious settlers
are, we need nothing more than to read what those rabbis said
about a year ago, when felt strong and confident about their
power to determine Israeli politics.
"On October 14, 1992, Nadav Shraggay reported in `Haaretz' on
`a symposium on the subject of the proper Jewish attitudes toward
resident aliens in the Holy Land'. The symposium was held under
the joint auspices of the [Israeli] ministry of Religions, the
department for Talmudic education in the ministry of Education
and `Ateret Cohanim' Yeshiva". The latter teaches the laws
pertaining to the Temple, (which its rabbis expect to be soon
rebuilt) and the rules of animal sacrifices to be performed
there. In addition to training the priests for the pertinent
duties, it purchases (by means fair or foul) non-Jewish property
in Jerusalem in order to hand it over to the Jews. "Among the
speakers at that symposium was Rabbi Zalman Melamed, the chairman
of The Committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza
District. According to rabbi Melamed `there can be no dispute
that it would be ideal if the entire Land of Israel be settled
exclusively by the Jews. Every clod and every dunam of its land
is destined to be worked on by the Jews alone'.
"On October 11, 1992, Nadav Shraggay reported in `Haaretz'
about `the Appeal No. 3' of `The Committee of Rabbis of Judea,
Samaria and the Gaza District'. The appeal read: `It has already
been ruled by Our Rabbi, Tzvi Yehuda Kook of blessed memory, that
any decision, Jewish or non-Jewish, to rob us of any part of our
land can have no validity, because the Will of God will prevail'.
The rabbis of the Committee refer to the Palestinians as `animals
in human shape', and define all hopes of ever establishing `the
relations of trust or peace' with them as `a delusion inspired by
Satan'. If even Ariel Sharon keeps claiming that he believes in
peace with the Palestinians and in granting them an autonomy (on
his terms, to be sure), the quoted statement can only mean that
its authors perceive an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews as
deluded by Satan. Consequently, the principles of `The Committee
of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District' can be shared
only by those who recognize the absolute power of the rabbis over
all other Jews".
The aims of "The Committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria and the
Gaza District" and of their followers are larger, both
ideologically and territorially, than prevention of an autonomy
in any shape or form in the Territories now occupied by Israel,
since they define "Land of Israel" as constituting a much wider
area. "The rabbis of `The Committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria
and the Gaza District' assume that the truth in both religion and
politics has already been revealed in its entirety to the their
two rabbinical leaders, Avraham Yitzhak Kook and his son Yehuda
Tzvi Kook [died in 1983]. That `truth' implies, however, that the
entire Sinai peninsula is a part of the `Land of Israel', or, as
they suddenly discovered in the summer of 1982, that Beirut,
under its `true' name of `Be'erot', (a name appearing in the Book
of Joshua), also `belongs to the Jews'. At least a half of
Lebanon's territory alao `belongs to the Jews' according to that
`truth', as an `inheritance of the two [Israelite] tribes,
Zevulon and Naftali'. Hence, `the Committee of Rabbis of Judea,
Samaria and the Gaza District' cannot possibly give its approval
to the peace with Egypt or to the [Israeli] withdrawal from a
major part of Lebanon". This was the reason why "when Sadat was
assassinated the religious settlers rejoiced. They danced and
sang, hoping for a new war to instantly follow that
assassination, and for Israeli reconquest of the entire Sinai as
an outcome of that war".
In order to carry out these aims Gush Emunim desires to exert
predominant influence upon the political aims of Israel. "The
real intentions of the religious settlers, as documented by
utterances of their spiritual leaders are to determine the
policies of the State of Israel in the spirit of the `Redemption
Process' which they claim to know in advance. In contrast to
them, the secular settlers are not notably different in their
attitudes from the secular majority of Israeli Jews. In the past,
they had been influenced by monetary incentives, or by belief in
doing `a pioneering' in the Territories. Yet neither has changed
anything much in them. My conclusion is that an accomodation with
the secular settlers is possible, but with the religious settlers
absolutely impossible. Any search to accomodate the latter is not
only doomed to failure, but also bound to encourage them even
more in the pursuit of `complete Redemption'".
It is to be deplorable that the ideology of the religious
settlers is very seldom analyzed or even accurately described, by
the Palestinians, in Israel and in the Western media alike. The
silence of the latter may be explained easily by their reluctance
to offend their Jewish readers (or Jewish lobbies) through a
publication of anything which may be construed by any stretch of
imagination as an "irreverent attitude toward Jewish religion".
In contrast with trivia or disinformation, there is no way of
conveying any substantial information about the religious
settlers which would not imply a considerable amount of criticism
of the Jewish religion. Palestinian attitudes can be explained,
though not condoned, by their unwillingness to know anything much
about Israeli Jewish society. By asking any Palestinian "how a
settler looks?" it can be easily found out that in colloquial
Arab speech in the Territories, the word "settler" tout court
really means a religious settler. but this popular semantics
cannot excuse the Palestinian media from not even trying to
distinguish between the two types of settlers and their different
aims, for the sake of information or political tactics. And
insofar as I know, no media in the entire Arab world are in this
respect any different.
The silence of the Hebrew media and of the Israeli Jewish
society in general has complex reasons. On the one hand, there
still exist a lot of sympathy and support for the religious
settlers, even if dwindling as compared to the period of the
"national unity government" of 1984-90. This sympathy,
contrasting glaringly with the hostility towards the Haredim, can
be attributed to several concurrent reasons. In the first place,
the religious settlers serve zealoslly in the army, which remains
a symbolic bond uniting the Israeli Jewish society. They also
share many customs of the secular society: e.g. they wear the
same clothing and sing much the same songs, even if old
fashioned. In the second place, the settling, especially when
referred to as "pioneering", remains admired by many Israeli
Jews educated to worship "the Jewish pioneers" of bygone times.
This is operating especially among the Zionist "left". A leader
of Mapam, now a part of Meretz, Ya'akov Hazan, in mid-1970s and
1980s went out of his way to extol Gush Emunim for being true
"pioneers". Some influential writers affiliated with Labor
continue to do so even today.
On the other hand, about one half of Israeli Jews who, as
mentioned in Report 125, remain faithful to the ideals of "Jewish
exclusivity" and Jewish exclusive right to the "Land of Israel",
though they may interpret the latter ideal quite differently than
the religious settlers, as best proven by Likud's readiness to
withdraw from all of Sinai, still cannot but admire the religious
settlers for upholding its ideals in the Territories with such
resolve. This applies particularly to the West Bank to which
Likud and the religious share a deep attachment stemming from
their common worship of Jewish past, especially the Biblical
past. The support of religious parties for the religious settlers
is assured due to the shared adherence of religious commandments
and ideals. In this the Haredi parties are no exception, because
their rabbis believe that Jews have the sole right to the "Land
of Israel" even if they differ from Gush Emunim on specific
conditions under which this right should be claimed.
Labor's support for Gush Emunim is more covert. It stems from
the fact that nobody in the Israeli Jewish society can better
serve Labor's real policies (as explained in the opening part of
this report) of preserving Israeli rule in the Territories than
the religious settlers. Nothing can better serve to perpetuate
Israeli domination of the Territories than deploymant of the army
troops in settlements and highways linking them; nothing may
"look nicer" abroad, which is a factor which Labor, unlike Likud,
always takes into account. A domination resting on the naked and
undisguised power of the army would, by comparison, be a much
more inferior solution. This is why Likud, Labor and other
secular parties are reluctant to discuss the deep ideological
differences dividiing them from the religious settlers. And of
course, the Haredim dislike the discussion of such issues even
more than the seculars.
For those reasons, the political power of the religious settlers
should be regarded as much greater than their numbers, even if
their Israeli supporters are included. Their financial dependence
on the government hardly detracts from their power. I anticipate
their influence on the actual Israeli policies as remaining high
under Rabin government, even if its limits remain to be seen. Let
me give an example. As mentioned in Report 127, the single
freedom which the Palestinians of the Territories won as a result
of the Israel-PLO Agreement was the right to display their flag
and other national emblems. Yet on November 12, Hillel Cohen
could already report ("Kol Ha'ir") that "in the entire city of
Hebron one cannot see a single Palestinian flag on display". Why?
Because the religious settlers of Kiryat Arba and Hebron itself,
at once assault any house or even a whole neighborhood where this
flag can be seen, smash the windows and other property, beat the
people indiscriminately, often right in front of the Israeli army
soldiers. My own informants tell me that the same happens in many
villages near Hebron and other locations where religious settlers
are strong, but not in vicinity of secular settlements. No wonder
the Palestinians are infuriated by this, against Arafat and the
PLO no less than against the Israeli government. Their wrath
would be even more intense if their media did not do their best
to conceal such facts, in contrast to bodily injuries caused by
the religious settlers which are reported. Still, such a press
coverage cannot last long, simply because what too many people
know cannot be hushed up indefinitely.
For several weeks already the Hebrew press speaks of Rabin's
desire to preserve Arafat's influence over the Palestinians.
Arafat himself is being referred to, with some exaggeration, as
"a new and the most important ally of Israel". Yet it cannot be
doubted that the religious settlers have succeeded in reversing
Rabin's intentions in this respect. How far they will be able to
go to exact the Israeli government's surrender to their aims
remains an open question.